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Delivering New Nuclear Projects: A Megaprojects Perspective 
Purpose 
This conceptual paper draws on the megaprojects literature and salutary lessons from 
previous megaprojects to make recommendations for policymakers, promotors and project 
managers on how to structure and deliver new nuclear build programmes. 
Design/methodology/approach 
This paper is underpinned by the extant literature and an analysis of public domain data from 
three proposed new nuclear power plants in the UK. It identifies the main challenges facing 
new nuclear build projects and subsequently proposes lessons that can be learnt from 
megaprojects, in order to plan, structure and deliver new nuclear build programmes 
successfully. 
Findings 
The paper argues that megaprojects are simultaneously trait-making, rather than trait-taking, 
possess a temporality and timescale in excess of typical infrastructure projects, suffer from 
high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, are organisationally complex, costly and are highly 
likely to destroy rather than create value.  Secondly, it argues that the challenges facing new 
nuclear build are not merely technological but also institutional, political and societal in 
nature. The nature of these challenges is exemplified using three proposed n w nuclear build 
projects in the UK. 
Originality/value 
This is the first paper to draw on both extant megaproject theory and on an analysis of the 
public domain data from three proposed new nuclear power plants in the UK.  It makes 
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contributions to megaprojects theory and practice, and specifically to nuclear new build 
projects.  Importantly, it proffers recommendations for how new nuclear build programmes 
around the world might be structured, planned and delivered to minimise the risks of failure. 
Introduction 
The UK government faces an acute energy dilemma; that of accessing sources of energy that 
are both cheap for consumers, non-damaging to the environment and secure against geo-
political risks.  An aging fleet of nuclear power plants that currently generate approximately 
21% of the UK’s electricity (Department of Business, 2017) are due to be decommissioned 
by the mid 2020’s leaving a sizeable gap in the generating capacity available to the National 
Grid.  Coupled with this, the last of the UK’s coal fired power stations will go off-line around 
the same time (Vaughan, 2017).  The options for new energy generation are three-fold: gas 
(either imported or from the North Sea), renewables (including solar, wind and wave power) 
and nuclear (through an ambitious and expensive programme of new nuclear build projects).  
Each of these energy options has its own strengths and weaknesses.  For example, gas is 
cheap but risks leaving the UK increasingly reliant on imported suppliesgas.  And 
renewables, whilst falling in price, remain unreliable as a source of stable base-load power. 
Given that UK requires additional energy generation capacity before 2023, the government 
has made the construction of a fleet of new nuclear power plants a central pillar of its energy 
strategy: its argument being that nuclear power is able to provide large stable base load 
electricity generation, whilst supporting the drive for CO2 reductions.  However, nuclear 
power comes at a financial cost (in terms of the construction of hugely complex, safe power 
plants and long term decommissioning and waste disposal liabilities) and concentration of 
risk in a small fleet of nuclear reactors  (Ansar et al., 2016; Morris, 2016). 
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Research into the management of complex, socio-technological projects such as nuclear 
power plants (Invernizzi, Locatelli, & Brookes, 2017) has grown rapidly since the early 
2000’s and there is growing traction within academic and practitioner communities for these 
“megaprojects” to be considered a specialised field within the wider discipline of project 
management (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2014b; Li et al., 2017; 
Pollack et al., 2017).  Megaprojects are large- scale complex infrastructure projects that 
typically, although not exclusively, have a budget greater than US$1Billion; take many years 
to plan and construct, involve multiple stakeholders and are carried out under the watchful 
and often critical gaze of politicians, the public and the media (Zidane, Johansen and 
Ekambaram, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2014b; Mišić and Radujković, 2015). In a recent piece 
work(Frick, 2017), which addresses the need for the US to embark on a similarly extensive 
programme of infrastructure investment, Karen Trappenberg Frick capturesarticulates the 
essence of megaprojects using 7 C’s: colossal, captivating, costly, controversial and complex, 
thus requiring effective control measures and constant stakeholder communication.  These 
characteristics of megaprojects manifest themselves as overoptimistic project forecasts 
coupled with underestimated risks and inadequate levels of project contingency in budgets.  
This leads to cost overruns, project delays and long-term benefits shortfalls or even a collapse 
in the long-term project viability. 
Ansar et al., (2016) argue that big energy projects, such as new nuclear, are especially fragile 
and susceptible to technical, operational and political risks.  Nuclear power plants comprise 
myriad interdependent components, sub-systems and systems, both to generate nuclear power 
in a controlled fashion and to remain safe in the event of an exhaustive set of fault scenarios.  
They have lengthy planning and construction horizons and are typically delivered by 
complicated supply chains that span numerous organisational and national cultures 
(Saunders, Gale, & Sherry, 2015).  The additional complexities of the UK new nuclear build 
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programme were articulated clearly at the Nuclear New Build Forum in London on 20 April, 
2016 as follows: 
Large infrastructure projects require a range of key features and sufficient risk 
management to attract financing, but a new nuclear project has to go further still to 
draw in potential backers…. New nuclear programs need to align with associated 
infrastructure, such as grid and transport networks, as well as develop a supply 
chain, receive planning consents and engage with national and local government, 
along with the businesses, education establishments and communities in the area the 
project is based. They also need to have their reactor design scrutinised by national 
regulators, a process that in the UK can take as long as five years. In addition, the 
project needs to have a fuel supply, operations, maintenance and decommissioning 
strategy, looking as much as 80 years ahead. (WNN, 2016) 
This conceptual paper, which is based on publicly available information on the UK new 
nuclear build programme, argues that the challenges facing the UK’s new nuclear build 
programme are not merely technological but also institutional, political and societal in nature.  
It addresses three key research questions: 
1) What are megaprojects and how do they differ from traditional or non-megaprojects? 
2) What are the main challenges facing new nuclear build megaprojects? 
3) What lessons can policy makers, promoters and project management professionals learn 
from  past megaprojects, in order to plan, structure and deliver the new nuclear build 
programme successfully?  
The next section of the paper summarises the extant research into megaprojects.  Subsequent 
sections describe the status of, and challenges facing, the UK new nuclear build programme, 
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and discuss recommendations on how to most appropriately structure and deliver the UK new 
nuclear build programme.  
Megaprojects Research 
The notion of the megaproject – as an extremely complex and costly infrastructure project 
that attracts much public attention and has the potential to transform society - has been in 
existence since Selznick's (1949) study of megaproject management within the Tennessee 
Valley Authority in the United States.  More recent megaprojects include the Channel Tunnel 
Fixed Rail Link, other large transportation projects such as London’s Crossrail and the 
Edinburgh Tram Link project, bridges such as the Oresund link between Denmark and 
Sweden, energy projects and iconic public architecture such the Burj- Al-arab hotel in Dubai 
or Bilbao’s Guggenheim museum.   Irrespective of their particular form and function, all 
megaprojects involve large scale capital investments, a high level of political and public 
awareness and visibility and often substantial economic and environmental impact on local 
communities (Galloway, 2013).  Flyvbjerg (2014) provides the most commonly cited formal 
definition of a megaproject as a “large scale complex venture that typically costs US$1Billion 
or more, takes many years to develop, involves multiple public and private stakeholders, is 
transformational and impacts millions of people” (Flyvbjerg, 2014,p1).   
Mišić & Radujković (2015) describe megaprojects as “important drivers of society change”; 
a view echoed by (Zidane, Johansen and Ekambaram, 2013) who frame megaprojects as 
important landmarks for societies and nations.  The potential for megaprojects to effect 
considerable societal change is, however, a double- edged sword.  Politicians have often been 
too quick to seize on the potential of an iconic megaproject as a means of delivering a lasting, 
and high profile legacy  (Contemporaneous examples of this in the UK alone are the planned 
High Speed 2 London-Birmingham Rail-link, the Edinburgh Tram project and the London 
2012 Olympics).  Flyvbjerg (2014) characterises this temptation as the four sublimes of 
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megaprojects: The first of these is the technological sublime: the excitement and buzz of 
pushing the boundaries of current technology to create something innovative and spectacular. 
Second is the political sublime: the joy politicians get from the positive attention given by the 
media when starting megaprojects, and the enticing prospect of building a political legacy of 
iconic buildings or transport infrastructure. The third sublime is economic and is concerned 
with the economic benefits and job creation potential of the megaproject, coupled with the 
delight of engineers, architects, contractors, consultants, bankers, investors and lawyers who 
can enjoy the benefits of the oversized project budget. Finally, megaprojects enjoy an 
aesthetic sublime: the sheer pleasure of looking at something beautiful or iconic such as the 
London Shard building.   These four sublimes can create a potent and unstoppable wave of 
enthusiasm for megaprojects amongst politicians, policymakers, project promoters and the 
public at large; irrespective of the hard truths of the colossal size of the project budget, the 
numerous, often downplayed risks facing the project and the questionable assumptions on 
which the project benefits case has been made ( see for instance: Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & 
Rothengatter, 2003; Miller & Lessard, 2000; van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 
2008) 
 
To date, much of the literature on megaprojects has been case study based, drawing on single 
or multiple exemplars of past megaprojects to explore and validate new ideas and theories in 
megaprojects.  The extant literature has focussed on the political nature of funding 
megaprojects (strategic misrepresentation and the principle of the hidden hand) (Flyvbjerg, 
2014b); front end decision making (optimism bias and the need for reference class 
forecasting) (Flyvbjerg, 2013; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Williams, 2009) the poor performance 
of megaprojects in terms of cost escalation, delayed delivery and benefits shortfalls (Eweje, 
Turner and Müller, 2012; Winch, 2013; Boateng, Chen and Ogunlana, 2015; Davies, Gann 
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and Macaulay, 2017) the risks and challenges facing megaprojects (Priemus, Flyvbjerg and 
Wee, 2008; Sanderson, 2012; Irimia-Diéguez, Sanchez-Cazorla and Alfalla-Luque, 2014; 
Sanchez-cazorla, Alfalla-luque and Irimia-dieguez, 2017) and the wider consequences to 
society of this class of projects (Müller, 2011). More recent research has applied 
organisational theory to explore and explicate current practice in megaproject management.  
For example, (Biesenthal et al., 2017) draw on institutional theory to recommend that 
megaproject promoters and sponsors devote more effort to getting the institutional 
arrangements within the project in place before addressing the technical challenges facing the 
project; thereby enabling previously divergent actors, governed by different institutional rules 
and logics to collaborate and make sense of the emerging megaproject.  Similarly Brookes, 
Sage, Dainty, Locatelli, & Whyte (2017) explore the temporal nature of the megaprojects, 
arguing that megaprojects often outlast the Special Purpose or Joint Venture organisations 
that are created to deliver them.   
Other recent research has mapped out the development of megaproject management as a 
distinct domain of project management research.  Notable recent contributions to this debate 
have been attempts to identify the classic texts and papers in the literature on megaprojects 
(Flyvbjerg, 2017; Pollack et al., 2017) and bibliometric based analyses of the development of 
the megaprojects literature (Li et al., 2017). Both of these streams of research speak of 
megaprojects research reaching a tension point crossroads in its genesis; a tipping point 
where the scope and aims of the field require rethinking as a prelude to reaching a theoretical 
consensus on what megaprojects are and how they might better be structured, governed and 
delivered.   Li, Lu, Taylor, & Han (2017) end their paper with a call for the megaprojects 
research community to pursue more interdisciplinary and multilevel studies, to better 
combine theory and practice to address the real-life issues confronting megaprojects and to 
update the classic texts to reflect and lead practitioner practices.  
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Given that the McKinsey Global Institute (McKinsey and Company, 2016) predicts global 
infrastructure spending of US$3.4Trillion per year between 2013-2030 mainly implemented 
though large scale infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg and Turner, 2017) and that the global 
megaprojects market is estimated at US$6-9Trillion per year  (Flyvbjerg, 2014a) 
megaprojects look highly likely to remain central to society: captivating yet costly and 
controversial in equal measure .  The question we now need to address is whether 
megaprojects are a distinct class of project, requiring different governance and delivery 
structures from those expected in more conventional projects. 
Megaprojects, typically but not exclusively, have a budget greater than US$1Billion.  
However, (Pollack et al., 2017) argue that “the real mark of a megaproject is the 
organisational complexity, ambiguity, ambition, politicality and risk that are entailed” 
(Pollack et al., 2017, p2).  Given that many smaller, arguably more conventional projects also 
exhibit high levels of complexity, uncertainty and are highly political in nature (for example 
nuclear decommissioning projects), what are the features of megaprojects that distinguish 
them from more conventional projects? Table 1 draws on the relevant literature to highlight 
the key features of megaprojects and how they might be differentiated from conventional 
projects.  It confirms the view expressed by Bent Flyvbjerg that “Megaprojects are a 
completely different breed of project in terms of their level of aspiration, lead times, 
complexity, and stakeholder involvement. Consequently, they are also a very different type of 
project to manage.” (Flyvbjerg, 2014b, p6)    
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The UK new nuclear build programme 
There are three planned nuclear new generation projects in the United Kingdom: Hinkley 
Point C in Somerset, Moorside in West Cumbria and Wylfa Newydd on the Isle of Anglesey.  
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Each involves a different consortium of promoters, different reactor design technology and, 
most likely, different approaches to financing the projects.   
Hinkley Point C is a joint UK-French venture which will be part-funded by the Chinese 
nuclear industry.  The power plant, comprising two European Ppressurised Rreactors (EPRs),  
is estimated to cost £19.6Billion (WNN, 2017b) and is expected to be in operation by the end 
of 2025.  The EPR design aims to be safer, more reliable and more fuel efficient than its 
predecessor. The EPR will work in similar fashion to existing generations of the reactor; 
EPRs have already been approved for use in the UK, confirming the reactor meets safety 
requirements.  
Hinkley Point C is the most advanced project in terms of planning and construction; the UK 
government gave its approval to the project on 29
th
 September 2016 following EDF’s Final 
Investment Decision 28th July 2016. Consent for the placement of the structural concrete for 
the first nuclear safety-related structure at the site was granted in July 2017 and the 
groundworks and enabling infrastructure are proceeding at pace. (WNN, 2017b) 
The Moorside nuclear plant in West Cumbria, will be delivered by Nugen, currently a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Toshiba. Originally the Moorside site would have comprised 3 AP1000 
Pressurised Water Reactors supplied by Westinghouse (Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2016).  Although Nugen completed its Generic Design Assessment early in 2017 (WNN, 
2017a), major financial problems within Westinghouse and its parent company Toshiba led to 
a major strategic review of the project.  In December 2017, Nugen announced that KEPCO 
(Korean Electrical Power Company) was the new preferred bidder for acquiring Nugen from 
Toshiba. KEPCO will use their own APR1400 reactor design for Moorside, and work is now 
underway to secure Generic Design Assessment Approval for this technology (WNN, 
2017d).  No date has yet been set for either Final Investment Decision or negotiation with the 
UK government over the strike price at which the plant output will be sold.   
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The third planned nuclear power plant is Wylfa Newydd on the Isle of Anglesey in North 
Wales.  This plant will comprise two Advanced Boiling Water Reactors (ABWRs). ABWRs 
are known as “direct cycle reactors” so they pass the steam straight into the turbine from the 
reactor rather than passing in and out of the steam generator as with the APR1400 and EPR 
technology (Hitachi, 2014).   The Wylfa Newydd plant will be built and operated by Horizon 
(which is owned by Hitachi with the reactors supplied by Hitachi-GE). The ABWR remains 
in the regulatory assessment phase, with the earliest construction start date estimated to be 
2019. (WNN, 2017f).   The cost of the Wylfa Newydd project is currently estimated at 
£20Billion (WNN, 2016). (Saunders, Sherry and Gale, 2016) 
 
Challenges facing the 3 UK new nuclear build projects 
Table 2 compares the three new nuclear build projects, HPC, Moorside and Wylfa Newydd, 
in terms of the first 5C’s of Frick’s classification of megaprojects as  Colossal, Captivating, 
Costly, Controversial and Complex (Frick, 2017).  This analysis shows that the UK’s new 
nuclear build programme faces a number of sizeable technical challenges. For instance, the 
sheer technical complexity of the reactor technology and the differing levels of maturity of 
each of the three proposed reactor designs, each of which must be assessed and approved by 
the Office of Nuclear Regulation before final designs can be signed off.  Each site also 
requires extensive enabling infrastructure, from new transport and power connections to large 
earthworks and vast temporary accommodation blocks.  Each piece of the enabling 
infrastructure must not only be delivered as a stand-alone project, but also contains myriad 
interfaces to the other enabling works and to the main reactor and turbine design and 
construction, thereby increasing overall programme complexity and with it the potential for 
increasing costs and delaying the project.   These challenges are compounded by two further 
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technical obstacles; that of the fragmented and fragile nature of the nuclear supply chain in 
the UK (Saunders, Gale, & Sherry, 2015) and the need to simultaneously mobilise 1000’s of 
highly-skilled workers across three remote locations in the UK. It is questionable whether 
sufficient of these skilled resources a) actually  exist, and b) are readily available to mobilise 
onto a new project (typically, experienced complex project practitioners move from one 
megaproject to the next, e.g. from Heathrow Terminal 5 to London 2012 to CrossRail and 
now to the Thames Tideway Tunnel (Davies, Gann and Macaulay, 2017). In contrast, the 
construction phases of HPC, Moorside and Wylfa Newydd will not only overlap, but will be 
competing for specialist resources with other nuclear life-extension and decommissioning 
projects that are already underway.  Anecdotal evidence from nuclear industry project 
professionals suggests that the solution to the resource constraints on these megaprojects will 
be an eventual influx of Chinese nuclear workers, rapidly and expensively mobilised to 
complete the projects, without allowing the UK to develop its own nuclear skills capability 
and capacity. 
In addition to these technical challenges, Table 2 also demonstrates that many of the issues 
facing the projects are also institutional, societal and political in nature.  The size and 
complexity of new nuclear build projects demands that they are delivered by multiple parties 
located in different parts of the globe. This introduces cross-cultural challenges into an 
already problematic set of complex institutional arrangements between the project promoters, 
the contractors, investors and the UK government (Biesenthal et al., 2017).  This brings into 
play a huge number of organisational interfaces within the projects, each of which requires 
governance, contractual and behavioural mechanisms to be established, in parallel with the 
project definition and design phases.   
At the societal and political level, national governments, local authorities and business groups 
are focused on the economic benefits of the project and the resultant long-term development 
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of nuclear plants’ hinterland.  However, the mere mention of the term nuclear tends to be 
emotive and can lead to differences of opinion within a group of individuals and society as a 
whole. Opposition to nuclear technology may arise from a particular political persuasion or a 
deep affiliation to a green agenda. Individuals may have concerns over the safety and security 
aspects of nuclear and favour renewable forms of energy over nuclear, without necessary 
fully understanding the finer nuances of energy production economics. It is unfortunate that 
successive governments (not just in the UK) have had a tendency to downplay the risks 
associated with megaprojects and overplay the benefits that they deliver (Flyvbjerg, 2014b).  
This has led to a justifiable public scepticism over the proposed costs and benefits of all 
megaprojects, not just those in the safety-critical nuclear sector.   
The financial issues with nuclear new builds, however, are not just the huge sums of money 
required up front, but also the many years that need to pass before there is any return of 
investment.  This, as Table 2 shows, means a strike price is necessary to give investors’ 
confidence in the long term financial viability of the project.  Indeed the design and 
construction lifecycle of these nuclear megaprojects spans multiple governmental terms, an 
issue exacerbated by the UK’s decision to serve notice on its membership of the European 
Union and the associated Euratom treaty which governs all aspects of nuclear cooperation 
and nuclear material transfers across European Union nations (Roberts, 2017). 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Lessons for policy makers, promoters and project management professionals involved 
in UK new nuclear build projects 
For now, the UK government remains committed to new nuclear as a key part of its energy 
strategy.  Although the future of Moorside is currently uncertain given the change in 
ownership from Toshiba to KEPCO, the construction of Hinkley Point C is officially 
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underway and a final investment decision on Wylfa Newydd is expected in 2019 (WNN, 
2017c). These three plants face myriad technical, institutional, societal and political 
challenges.  The recommendations set out in Table 3 take the lessons from the megaprojects 
literature,  with the aim of helping policy makers, promoters and project management 
professionals deliver Hinkley Point C, Moorside and Wylfa Newydd, whilst minimising the 
risk of overspend and delay on these colossal yet controversial projects.  These 
recommendations are again structured around Frick’s (2017) 5C’s of megaprojects, 
acknowledging that these categories are not mutually exclusive and that many of the 
recommendations will address more than one of the 5C’s. For example, putting the 
management of risk at the heart of these projects, will counter the colossal nature of the 
project, as well as its complexity and cost.  And, making project decision making and project 
data as transparent as possible should minimise the temptation for policy makers and 
promoters to become over-captivated by the projects and also mitigate inevitable controversy 
that the project generates.  
Whilst the recommendations in Table 3 are grounded in the megaprojects literature and 
evidence from a large number of past megaprojects – both good and bad – the real challenge 
facing the UK’s and other nuclear new build programmes is to take on board this advice 
sufficiently early in the projects’ scoping and feasibility phases.  The reality is that many of 
the recommendations set out in Table 3 come too late for projects such as Hinkley Point C – 
which is already underway and which, according to Morris (2016) is a financial, technical, 
contractual and governance “mess”.  It is highly unlikely that the UK government would be 
prepared or able to begin the procurement process for HPC again, as Morris (2016) suggests, 
with sunk costs on the project already into the Billions of pounds. 
Additionally, there are practical limitations in a number of the recommendations.  For 
example, as Morris (2016) argues, what is the correct reference class to use for the time and 
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cost forecasting of new nuclear build projects.  Past UK nuclear projects were completed 
decades ago in different times, using different technologies (Taylor, 2016) and worldwide 
those nuclear power plants currently under construction are invariably running late and over-
budget.  And, how feasible is it for politicians and policy makers to hold fast to a “wait or do 
nothing option” as argued by (Davies, Gann and Macaulay, 2017) while energy analysts and 
commentators warm apocalyptically of the “lights going out in the UK by 2025”.  Finally, 
would any of these vast projects ever pass a final investment decision without a sense of 
optimism (Flyvbjerg, 2014b) that if we can put a man on the moon and contemplate travelling 
to Mars then we can surely build a fleet of new nuclear power stations here on Earth.   
The above caveats aside the recommendations provided in Table 3 provide a framework for 
project scoping, delivery and decision making for worldwide new nuclear power plant 
construction.  At the very least the recommendations provide a set of questions that 
promoters, policy-makers and project managers involved in these projects would be advised 
to take heed of.  Whilst the die may be cast for Hinkley Point C, Flamanville and Olkiluoto 3, 
it is not too late for Moorside and Wylfa Newydd and other proposed plants around the globe 
that are still in the feasibility and scoping stage to learn from the literature and practice of 
megaprojects as described in this paper. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Conclusions 
This conceptual paper makes contributions to theory and practice in the domain of 
megaprojects, and specifically to nuclear new build projects.  Theoretically the paper reviews 
the literature on megaprojects and synthesises a set of features of megaprojects that 
distinguish them from more conventional projects.  We argue that megaprojects are 
simultaneously trait-making, rather than trait-taking, possess a temporality and timescale in 
Page 14 of 30International Journal of Managing Projects in Business
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of M
anaging Projects in Business
excess of typical infrastructure projects, suffer from high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, 
are organisationally complex, costly and are highly likely to destroy rather than create value.  
Secondly, we argue that the challenges facing new nuclear build are not merely technological 
but also institutional, political and societal in nature. The nature of these challenges is 
exemplified using the three proposed new nuclear build projects in the United Kingdom.    
In terms of contributions to practice, we draw on the megaprojects literature and the lessons 
from previous megaprojects to proffer recommendations for how the new nuclear build 
programmes, both in the UK and in other regions of the world might be structured, planned 
and delivered to minimise the risks of failure.   
The major limitation in this study is that it is based on a theoretical literature review and 
public domain data only.  That said, there is no shortage of case study based megaprojects 
research which has been used to propose and validate a number of theories of megaprojects.  
Indeed, (Li et al., 2017) argues that the field of megaprojects research now requires more 
interdisciplinary and multilevel studies and studies that combine theory and practice to 
address the real life issues faced by mega projects.  This paper contributes to this research 
agenda by drawing on both extant megaproject theory and the challenges facing a specific set 
of nuclear new build megaprojects, to propose a set of succinct recommendations for 
policymakers, promoters and practitioners tasked with delivering these colossal yet 
controversial projects.   
As such, this paper lays the groundwork for future empirical research into the planning and 
delivery of this new generation of new nuclear build projects.  A future research agenda, with 
proposed research questions might encompass the following areas: 
Firstly, interviews with new nuclear build project policy-makers, promotors and project 
managers to identify the specific challenges involved in new nuclear build projects and the 
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differences and similarities between new nuclear build and other megaprojects. This would 
validate and extend the findings of this current conceptual paper.  Secondly, further empirical 
Empirical work is now required to track the three nuclear new build projects, the extent to 
which they have adopted this set of recommendations and the subsequent performance of the 
projects.  Such empirical studies are likely to be qualitative in nature, and utilise a number of 
research methods including semi-structured interviews and ethnographic observations.  
Finally, the challenges facing the nuclear sector extend beyond the provision of new nuclear 
power capability.  In the UK and across the globe, major nuclear decommissioning works are 
underway to dismantle, make safe and return former civil nuclear sites to a clean state. Many 
of these projects have budgets that are in excess of £1Billion, will span a number of decades 
and involve the same complexities and uncertainties of technology, stakeholders and funding 
as new nuclear build projects.  Further empirical studies that specifically address the under-
researched domain of nuclear decommissioning projects would also contribute to our 
conceptualisation of megaprojects, and to addressing the real life issues faced by nuclear 
megaprojects over the entire nuclear lifecycle.  
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Distinguishing 
Feature of 
Megaprojects 
Description and contrast with conventional 
projects 
Underpinning studies 
Trait-making Megaprojects seek to change the structure of 
society, and can impact many thousands and 
even millions of people.  In contrast more 
conventional projects are trait-taking, i.e., the 
project fits within existing societal structures 
and routines 
(Hirschman, 1995; Galloway, 
2013; Mišić and Radujković, 
2015) 
 
Temporality and 
Timescale 
Megaproject design and construction 
timescales can outlast governments and often 
the organisational or corporate structures that 
deliver and manage them. Criteria of success 
for megaprojects need to include long-term 
benefits 
(Eduardo Yamasaki Sato 
and De Freitas Chagas Jr, 
2014; Biesenthal et al., 
2017; Brookes et al., 2017) 
High levels of 
risk, uncertainty 
and ambiguity 
Megaproject success criteria can be vague 
and even misrepresented. Multiple 
stakeholders can increase ambiguity and 
uncertainty.  Use of untried and novel 
technologies within highly complex 
interconnected infrastructure systems can 
increase risks.  
(Priemus, Flyvbjerg and 
Wee, 2008; Nielsen, Dignum 
and Reilly, 2013; Irimia-
Diéguez, Sanchez-Cazorla 
and Alfalla-Luque, 2014; 
Chapman, 2016; Biesenthal 
et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; 
Sanchez-cazorla, Alfalla-
luque and Irimia-dieguez, 
2017)  
Organisational 
Complexity 
Megaprojects must bring into alignment a wide 
diversity of actors, organisations and 
stakeholders with often conflicting interests 
and conflicting visions of the megaproject. 
(Priemus, Flyvbjerg and 
Wee, 2008; Zidane, 
Johansen and Ekambaram, 
2013; Biesenthal et al., 
2017; D.C. Invernizzi, 
Locatelli and Brookes, 2017) 
Cost Huge budgeted costs (generally >$US1B), 
require complex financing structures and often 
guarantees from host governments and/or 
international finance institutions.  Accuracy of 
cost estimating, cost control and levels of 
contingency funding is reduced. 
(Morris and Hough, 1987; 
Zhai, Xin and Cheng, 2009; 
Boateng, Chen and 
Ogunlana, 2015; Biesenthal 
et al., 2017)  
High propensity 
for value 
destruction 
Due to their size, complexity and timescales 
megaprojects are highly likely to experience 
huge cost escalation and delayed delivery 
which can destroy value at the project, 
promoter, political and even national level.  
The megaproject may consume limited 
resources (people, finance, space etc) that 
might have been better employed elsewhere to 
generate value. 
(Merrow, 1988; Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 
2003; Gellert and Lynch, 
2003; Eweje, Turner and 
Müller, 2012) 
Table 1: Distinguishing Features of Megaprojects 
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 Hinkley Point C Moorside Wylfa Newydd 
Colossal  Plant will generate 7% of the total 
UK’s energy needs ( Each reactor will 
generate 1.6GW of electricity) 
 Supply chains span Europe and the 
rest of the world.  
 Installation of 35,000 supporting 
arrangements and 10,000 items of 
mechanical plant (Jones, 2017)  
 Construction of 760 metre long and 
13.5 metre high sea wall to protect 
the plant from natural disasters (EDF, 
2016)  
 One of largest and riskiest UK 
infrastructure projects currently 
underway (Morris, 2016) 
 Project claims to be Europe’s largest 
new nuclear project, requiring a 9km 
railway track for access (Macadam, 
2016)  
 There will be three separate 
accommodation sites covering over 
200 acres, and providing 
accommodation for up 5000 people 
and car parking for almost 1500 cars 
(Whitehaven News, 2016) 
  It will be one of largest and riskiest 
UK infrastructure projects  
 Wylfa Newydd will provide 5.4 GWe 
of new capacity to power 10 million 
homes starting mid 2020’s.  
 Early in 2017 it was announced that 
Anglesey’s old oil depot was the “front 
runner” to house thousands of Wylfa 
Newydd construction workers (Wyn-
Williams, 2017)  
 It will be one of largest and riskiest 
UK infrastructure projects 
 
Captivating  Politically essential to UK 
government’s energy strategy 
(Department of Business, 2017)  
 25,000 new employment opportunities 
created during construction   
 Peak employment around 5,600 
people  
 4 million cubic metres of earth to be 
excavated –equivalent to 1,300 
Olympic swimming pools 
 3 million tonnes of concrete required 
– 75 times more concrete than in 
Millennium Stadium in Cardiff 
 230,000 tonnes of steel reinforcement 
to be used (EDF, 2016) 
 The project is seen as the start up for 
the UK becoming the “global leader” 
in nuclear energy and is inspiring 
young engineers and scientists.  
 Aim is to train 400 apprentices 
(Macalister, 2014)  
 Politically essential to UK 
government’s energy strategy 
(Department of Business, 2017) 
 An estimated 6500 jobs will be 
required during peak construction. 
 The sites may become permanent 
features once construction is 
complete, providing a legacy in the 
area for the locals. (NuGen, 2016) 
 
 Politically essential to UK 
government’s energy strategy 
(Department of Business, 2017) 
 4000+ jobs to be created during 
construction with 850 permanent jobs 
required post construction (Power-
Technology, 2017) 
 Opportunity to provide apprenticeship 
schemes and attract young engineers 
to the nuclear industry. 
 New partnership between Horizon 
and Exelon towards becoming a 
“world class nuclear operator” 
(HorizonNews, 2017) 
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Costly  Hinkley was given an original 
£6Billion  estimated cost, now 
estimated at £19.6Billion (Smyth, 
Lecoeuvre and Vaesken, 2017; WNN, 
2017b) 
 Hinkley Point C’s strike price is 
£92.50/MWh (almost double the 
current wholesale price of 
electricity).(Jones, 2017) 
 Financial impact of likely cost and 
schedule overruns may bankrupt an 
already debt laden EDF (Morris, 
2016) 
 Moorside is estimated to be a £10 
billion project, representing the largest 
private investment project in West 
Cumbria (NuGen, 2016)  
 This budget is expected to rise 
considerably. 
  A guaranteed strike price has not yet 
been confirmed, but Nugen’s intention 
is to seek a lower strike price than 
HPC, with the investment being 
considered a “long-term vision” 
(Bounds, 2015)  
 
 Wylfa Newydd is a £14 billion project 
with hopes of delivering a “fair and 
acceptable” strike price, below that of 
Hinkley Point C. (Hughes, 2016)  
 There is potential for a governmental 
30% equity stake in the project, with 
ministers admitting that taxpayer’s 
money will be required to underpin 
the project. (Hughes, 2017) 
 
Controversial  Slow progress on project due to 
Greenpeace opposition and public 
concerns regarding the cost and long-
term viability of the technology 
coupled with concerns about nuclear 
safety post Fukushima accident. 
 Tom Burke, ex government advisor 
and chairman of the environmental 
pressure group E3G, argues that the 
UK’s new nuclear builds are 
“unproven” and believes the UK is 
following in the footsteps of previous 
generations nuclear catastrophes. 
(Jones, 2017) 
 Critics say that government should be 
focussing on incentivising wind and 
other renewables, rather than 
subsidising new nuclear 
 Controversy over whether the UK 
government should trust the French 
and the Chinese companies to 
construct this new nuclear power 
station. (Chu, 2016) 
 There are concerns over the tourism 
legacy in the Lake District as if the 
point of critical radioactivity is reached 
(low risk) over half the Lake District 
would be inaccessible for at least 20 
years.  
 Cumbria Tourist Board do not 
currently support the project due to 
fears over a Chernobyl style accident. 
 However both Cumbria County 
Council and Guardians of the Lakes 
National Park hold no objections to 
the project (Lakestay, 2016)  
 Campaigners from Radiation Free 
Lakeland have labelled the project an 
“intolerable burden” (News&Star, 
2017) 
 There is local concern over the impact 
of the project on the road and rail 
networks and the local health care 
and house prices. Mirehouse 
inhabitants heavily oppose the new 
accommodation developments 
 Amlwch town council oppose the 
temporary accommodation camps to 
be built in the town, preferring to 
house workers in the former Shell oil 
depot (Wyn-Williams, 2017).  
 PAWB (People Against Wylfa B) 
question the Japanese firm’s 
commitment and ability to deliver this 
project.  
 Protestors claim nuclear to be “old 
fashioned, dangerous and dirty.” 
(Wyn-Williams, 2016) 
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 Critics say that strike price is bad 
value in the current market as the 
wholesale price of energy has 
collapsed in the last 3 years or so, to 
around £45 per megawatt hour, as 
opposed to the £92.50 per megawatt 
hour strike price for Hinkley units. 
This potentially equals a controversial 
cost of up to £30 billion on the UK 
consumers backs (Chu, 2016)  
comparing them to “ghetto 
camp[s]”(News&Star, 2016).  
 
Complex  No EPR is yet in operation anywhere 
in the world. First reactors at Olkiluoto 
and Flamanville are hugely over-
budget and delayed.  HPC reactor 
design is untried and unproven 
(Morris, 2016) 
 The first part of the complex 
construction process involves civil 
work and earthworks to prepare the 
site for construction; a total of 4 
million square metres of earth needs 
to be moved before construction can 
even begin. In addition to this, 70 
miles of engineering and fitted pipe 
systems are needed for each reactor. 
It has been said that 60% of the 
project is to be nuclear construction, 
the remaining 40% is additional work 
including the jetty and sea wall as well 
as drilling tunnels for cooling pipes 
that will go out to sea (Macalister, 
2014).  
 Huge governance issues on the 
project  in particular the tension 
between political expediency and 
professional project management 
practices (Morris, 2016) 
 Alongside the reactor and turbine 
buildings, support buildings including 
a substation and a circulating water 
system will be required.  
 Earthworks needed for screening and 
noise reduction.  Replacement 
habitats will also be required and 
flood plain compensation if 
necessary.  
 Surface water, sewer drainage 
systems and fresh groundwater 
extraction facility required  (NuGen, 
2016) 
  A transport access strategy is 
required for access to and from site; 
this strategy will include rail and sea 
via a marine off-loading facility, 
extensions to the existing railway line 
improvements to the local road 
network (NuGen, 2016)  
 Requirement for new £2.8 billion, 
164km partially underground power 
line to connect Moorside to the 
National Grid (WNN, 2017e) 
 The development consent order 
(DCO) is scheduled for submission in 
2017 following on from the generic 
design assessment (GDA) of the 
ABWR reactors which was submitted 
in 2014.  
 Horizon has already conducted soil 
investigations, traffic and transport 
surveys and ecological studies on 
site. 
 Enabling infrastructure projects are 
required such as the MOLF (marine 
off-loading facility), cooling structure, 
power transmission infrastructure and 
administration buildings (Power-
Technology, 2017) 
 Project also includes 3 radioactive 
waste storage buildings providing 
safe and secure storage for the waste 
onsite. When the waste can be 
“repackaged” it will be taken to a 
radioactive waste disposal facility 
currently in the planning stage 
(Kelsey, 2016).  
 
Table 2: Challenges facing UK New Nuclear Build Projects 
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Colossal Captivating Controversial Costly Complex 
Allow sufficient time/effort for 
front end decisions and 
project scoping activities 
(provide alternative solutions 
to problems)  (Mišić & 
Radujković, 2015; Priemus, 
Flyvbjerg, & Wee, 2008; T. 
Williams, 2009) 
Assess what worked on 
previous nuclear projects 
(lessons learnt, site visits, 
consult experts) (Davies, 
Gann, & Macaulay, 2017) 
Make project data as 
transparent and visible as 
possible to avoid contested 
information. Have a single 
point of truth for the project. 
(Klakegg, Williams, & 
Shiferaw, 2015; Priemus et 
al., 2008) 
Make nuclear funding 
mechanisms transparent 
(avoid over-complex/opaque 
financing structures where 
possible) (Taylor, 2016) 
Organise for the unseen 
(don’t neglect the wait or do 
nothing option) (Davies et al., 
2017) 
Pay attention to the weakest 
links in the technology and 
the organisation – for 
instance impurities in reactor 
steel at Flamanville (Ansar, 
Flyvbjerg, Budzier, & Lunn, 
2016) 
Establish effective project 
governance mechanisms 
(within and cross 
organisational) (Biesenthal, 
Clegg, Mahalingam, & 
Sankaran, 2017; Morris & 
Geraldi, 2011)  
Deploy rigorous and 
transparent front end 
decision making.  
Devote time/effort to active 
stakeholder management 
(Locatelli, Mikic, Kovacevic, 
Brookes, & Ivanisevic, 2017) 
Prepare for conflict between 
“political goal setters and 
practical [nuclear project ]  
professionals” (Morris, 2016, 
p18)  
 
Avoid one-size fits all 
contracts (fixed price more 
appropriate for low 
uncertainty areas, target-cost 
for more uncertain domains) 
(Davies et al., 2017) 
Pay particular attention to the 
interfaces – technical and 
organisational. Try to build a 
project culture that cuts 
across different institutional 
or national cultures.(Davies & 
Mackenzie, 2014) 
Implement rigorous project 
gateway review process 
(Klakegg et al., 2015) 
Use reference class 
forecasting for costs, 
timescales, risks and 
benefits. Interrogate the 
business case closely. 
Organise regular, real and 
responsive community 
involvement (Locatelli et al., 
2017)Engage early and often 
with communities close to the 
Foster early nuclear 
contractor involvement and 
relationship building 
(Saunders, Gale, & Sherry, 
2016) 
Where possible reduce 
technical complexity in the 
planning stage to reduce the 
level of uncertainty. (Giezen, 
2012) 
Field Code Changed
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(Flyvbjerg, 2013)  Consider 
carefully what appropriate 
reference class for new 
nuclear build is ((Morris, 
2016) 
new nuclear build(Invernizzi, 
Locatelli, & Brookes, 2017)  
Set up process for inevitable 
design changes (whether 
technical, institutional or 
political) – Police this 
process closely. (Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 
2003) 
Make every effort to 
consciously avoid 
hubris/optimism bias.  
(Flyvbjerg, 2014) 
Keep governmental 
communications channels 
wide open and two-
way(Morris, 2016). 
Generate realistic cost 
estimates, retain sufficient 
contingency funds and 
acknowledge the 
uncertainties in nuclear 
projectsy rather than 
hide/ignore themit. (Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2003; Klakegg et al., 
2015; Saunders, Sherry, & 
Gale, 2016) 
Promote increasing 
professionalism of project 
organisations  (Klakegg et 
al., 2015) 
Establish and maintain good 
risk management discipline 
(covering design, 
construction, operation, 
labour, legal, political, 
contractual, financial and 
economic risks) (Brookes, 
Sage, Dainty, Locatelli, & 
Whyte, 2017; Sanchez-
cazorla, Alfalla-luque, & 
Irimia-dieguez, 2017) 
Consider new nuclear build 
as a portfolio of projects at 
governmental level (phase 
activities where possible to 
limit strain of resources) 
  Reduce reliance on bespoke 
nuclear solutions – use 
scalable/modular solutions 
and test/pilot new technology 
off site first. (Ansar et al., 
2016; Davies et al., 2017) 
Table 33: Recommendations for policy makers, promotors and project managers for new nuclear build projects
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